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Recent concerns about the transfer of U.S. services jobs to overseas workers have deepened
long-standing fears about the effects of trade on the domestic labor market. But a balanced
view of the impact of trade requires that we consider jobs created through the production of
U.S. exports as well as jobs lost to imports. A new measure of the jobs gained and lost in
international trade flows suggests that the net number of U.S. jobs lost is relatively
small—2.4 percent of total U.S. employment as of 2003.
I
n the aftermath of the 2001 recession,the per-
ception has grown that vast numbers of U.S.
services jobs are being relocated to India,China,
and other developing countries.Anecdotes abound ofcompa-
nies using overseas call centers,computer programmers,help
desk workers, and accountants while closing down whole
departments here.The alleged surge in relocations after 2001
coincided for some years with a sluggish job recovery,
prompting many to conclude that the “offshoring”of jobs
accounted for much of the persistent weakness in the U.S.
labor market. While concerns about job relocations were
fueled by the slow job growth during the recovery,the belief
that U.S.workers are losing jobs to foreign competition has a
much longer history:Indeed,the current concerns echo those
voiced in many earlier periods about the impact of inter-
national trade on domestic workers.
In this edition of Current Issues,we explore the relation-
ship between trade and job creation in the United States.In
doing so,we adopt two premises.First,the offshoring of jobs
is best seen as another form of import activity rather than an
altogether new phenomenon.Second,a careful analysis of the
effect of recent trade patterns on the U.S. labor market
requires that we measure not only the jobs lost to imports but
also the jobs created through the production of U.S.exports.
Our strategy is to obtain a measure of the net effect of trade
on the nation’s employment—a measure we term “U.S.jobs
embodied in net imports”—and to examine the behavior of
this measure over the last two decades.Because we consider
both the U.S. jobs embodied in the goods and services
imported to the United States and the U.S.jobs embodied in
the production of the country’s exports,our estimate of jobs
lost to trade is more balanced and complete than the esti-
mates presented in earlier studies.
We have two main findings.First,we determine that the
offshoring of jobs has been a limited phenomenon: Our
comprehensive estimate of the number of jobs embodied
in U.S.net imports is small relative to total employment in
the United States1—2.4 percent of the total,at the most—
both historically and in recent years.Moreover,this estimate
is sometimes positive and sometimes negative,suggesting
that international trade does not necessarily mean a loss of
jobs for the United States.
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Second,we find no evidence to support the claims that a
surge in offshoring played a large role in the jobless recovery.
Jobs embodied in net imports did not grow at an accelerated
pace after the 2001 recession.In fact,the increase in U.S.jobs
sent abroad has averaged about 30,000 per month since 2001—
a decelerationfrom the monthly average increase of 45,000 jobs
during the period from 1997 to 2001.
More broadly,our results show no clear or necessary rela-
tionship between a pickup in jobs lost to tradeand weakness
in the U.S.labor market.A case in point is the 1997-2001
acceleration in offshoring,which occurred when U.S.pay-
rolls were expanding steadily.
Common Assumptions about the Outsourcing of Jobs
We begin by scrutinizing three common assumptions that
are explicit or implicit in the argument that jobs lost to trade
account for a large part of the weak performance of the U.S.
labor market during the recovery—a period we define here
as beginning in 2001 and lasting through the end of 2003.
Imports and trade imbalances more generally surged
in the 2001-03 period.
The first assumption is that imports made unprecedented
new inroads in many industries during and after the 2001
recession.If this were the case,we would expect to see a sharp
acceleration in imports and the trade deficit in recent years.
Observed trade volumes, however, suggest a different
scenario.Net imports in the three sectors that make up the
private economy—services,durable manufacturing,and non-
durable manufacturing—all rose during the 2001 recession
and the years following,but the increase in each case continued
a trend that had existed at least since 1997 (Chart 1).Thus,
there is no evidence—at this high level of aggregation—of
any sudden upturn in imports or trade deficits in these sec-
tors in 2001-03.Instead,it appears that faster growth in cer-
tain industries was balanced by slower growth in others,so
that overall growth rates were consistent with previous
trends.
The outsourcing of jobs to foreign workers has caused a
sharp increase in layoffs.
The second assumption is that the loss of jobs to trade has
caused the closing of an unprecedented number of plants
and offices in the United States and the consequent dismissal
of huge numbers of workers.Such a large-scale displacement
could pose a serious problem for labor market adjustment.
Once again,however,this assumption does not square well
with the facts. The Business Employment Dynamics data
issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) do show that
the rate of job destruction (as a percentage of employment)
shot up briefly during the recession,from 7.5 percent in the sec-
ond quarter of 2000 to 8.3 percent in the third quarter of 2001.2
Nevertheless, the rate subsequently dropped to 6.7 percent,
lower than the job destruction rates seen over the course of
the expansion in the 1990s (Chart 2).Additional evidence
against the view that offshoring has created a surge in layoffs
comes from the Mass Layoff Statistics program.This BLS
program, which tracks major job cutbacks among U.S.
employers and the reasons for the cutbacks,shows no post-
recession elevation in layoffs attributable to foreign competi-
tion or other reasons.3
2
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: The shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chart 1
Net Imports by Sector
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Chart 2
Job Gains and Losses as a Percentage of Employment, 1992-2003
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How,then,can we account for the dearth of jobs during
the recovery? The answer is that job creation rates fell dra-
matically,from 8.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 1999 to a
low of 6.9 percent in the first quarter of 2003.In other words,
employment growth was slow because firms were hiring
many fewer workers than they were during the preceding
expansion,not because they were laying them off more rap-
idly. If trade was in fact driving the sluggish job recovery,it
must have been working to suppress thecreation of new jobs
rather than to generate more layoffs.
Sectors with high or growing trade lagged more than
other sectors in job creation.
The third assumption is that sectors that are heavily or
increasingly exposed to trade suffered disproportionate job
losses during the recession and recovery.To test this assump-
tion,we examine job growth rates in this period relative to
growth rates during the 1990s expansion for both trade-sensitive
and trade-insensitive industries (Chart 3). Starting with
goods-producing industries,we find that manufacturing—
one of the sectors most exposed to trade—did indeed lose a
disproportionate share of jobs during the downturn and sub-
sequent recovery. However, mining and natural resources,
another heavily traded industry, performed better in this
period than in the preceding expansion,while the nontraded
construction industry experienced disproportionate job losses.
Turning to services,we find that the results are even more
mixed.Business services—an industry in which outsourcing is
believed to have taken a large toll on domestic jobs—saw
above-average job losses during the recession and recovery.
However,finance,insurance,wholesale trade,and management
and engineering jobs did relatively well,despite often-voiced
concerns about outsourcing.Moreover,a number of services
industries that are notexposed to trade incurred above-average
employment losses;the leisure and hospitality trades,for ex-
ample,do not transfer jobs to overseas workersbut still experi-
enced heavy payroll shortfalls relative to the preceding period.
The absence of any consistent pattern in the fortunes of
individual industries suggests that while trade-related compe-
tition may have driven job losses in some sectors,layoffs in
many other sectors occurred for reasons unrelated to trade.
Indeed,in a number ofindustries,forces such as technological
change,investment overhangs,and changing consumption
behavior are much more likely to have caused job losses.
In sum,all three assumptions we have examined appear
to be flawed or exaggerated.To be sure,jobs have been lost
through trade flows,but there is no evidence that offshoring
has produced rampant job destruction or that industries
heavily exposed to trade have,as a group,lost a dispropor-
tionate number of jobs.
Measuring U.S.Equivalent Jobs Embodied in Trade
To get a more accurate picture of the employment changes
brought about by trade,we propose a new formulation of the
effects of trade on U.S. jobs. Currently, the discussion is
framed in terms of the question “How many jobs is the
United States losing to foreign workers?”However,looking at
the issue in this way overlooks two important considera-
tions. First, the use of foreign labor to produce a good or
service is analogous to importing intermediate goods—
inputs used to make other,final goods—when those inputs
might instead have been produced domestically.Thus,using
foreign labor is just another form of international trade
rather than a new and disquieting development.
Second,given that trade flows in both directions,exports
as well as imports must be considered in any assessment of
the effect of trade on U.S.jobs.After all,while some jobs are
lost to imports,others are created through the production of
exports.Thinking about trade’s employment effects as a two-
way phenomenon leads us to ask the more essential question,
“What have been the job implications of recent flows of
goods and services to and from the United States?”
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: For the closing date of the recession and recovery period, we use April 2003,
the last month for which Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industrial detail
is available. Although job growth did not resume until August 2003, 96 percent of the
period’s losses occurred between March 2001 and April 2003.
Chart 3
Job Growth Rates in the Recent Recession and Recovery
Relative to the 1990s Expansion
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The importance of looking at exports as well as imports is
best understood by examining how the experiences of indi-
vidual workers are “counted”in trade flows.What we find is
that U.S.job losses,like U.S.job gains,are sometimes counted
in import flows and sometimes in export flows.Consider first
the hypothetical case of Dan,a U.S.software programmer.His
company has fired him and hired programmers in India to
replace him.If the company sells the software in the United
States,the firing of Dan will mean the loss of a U.S.job and an
increase in U.S.software imports from India.Alternatively,if
the company sells the software abroad,then Dan’s job loss will
be reflected in lower U.S.software exports.Thus,in assessing
the effects of trade,one cannot readily isolate imports from
exports because the loss of a U.S.job might produce either a
drop in exports or a rise in imports.
Similarly,U.S.job gains may be counted on either side of
U.S.-foreign trade flows.Denise,a consultant employed in the
United States,has two current assignments.For the first assign-
ment,she advises an American company on how to penetrate
the Asian marketplace.Company managers had initially hired
an Asian consultant but soon realized that they preferred
Denise,with her U.S.business school education,for the job.
Hence,Denise’s first assignment reduces consultancy services
imports to the United States. Denise’s second assignment
involves advising a European company that is considering
launching a product in the United States.This assignment con-
tributes to consultancy services exports.Thus,U.S.jobs created
through U.S.trade can either decrease imports or raise exports.
To determine the job implications ofbilateral trade flows,we
first calculate how many U.S.workers,at current wages,prices,
and productivity levels,would be needed to produce the goods
and services imported by the United States.We then calculate
how many U.S. jobs are needed to produce the goods and
services exported by the United States.By subtracting the
second number from the first,we obtain a net measure of the
employment effects of trade.Since U.S.imports exceed U.S.
exports, this is essentially a measure of the number of jobs
needed to produce U.S.net imports domestically.Thus,we call
this measure U.S.jobs embodied in net imports.4
The methodology we use to estimate the net measure is
described in detail in the box.In essence,however,we com-
pute this measure by multiplying the change in U.S.output
4
Our calculation of U.S. jobs embodied in net imports is based
on the following equation:
To compute the amount of nominal output required to
replace U.S. net imports for each key sector, we use the
sequence of U.S. input-output tables for 1983-2000 developed
by Chentrens and Andreassen (2003) for the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). We begin by calculating an industry-by-
commodity requirement matrix, as explained in Chentrens
and Andreassen. This matrix provides us with an estimate of
the amount of industry output required per dollar of each good
or service supplied to final users.
We then multiply this requirement matrix by the amounts
of net imports of goods and services. That is, we assume that
the net imports, initially assumed to flow to U.S. final users,
are now produced in the United States. The result of this cal-
culation provides us with an estimate of the amount of output
required from each sector, at current factor prices, to replace
net imports. This is essentially the first ratio in the right-hand
side of the equation and is measured in current dollars.
Next, we calculate the number of jobs embodied in these
output levels by multiplying the levels by the number of
workers per dollar of output for each sector, which is the sec-
ond ratio in the right-hand side of the equation. The employ-
ment data are taken from Current Employment Statistics, a
BLS series.
Because we do not have any input-output tables for the years
after 2000, we use the 2000 requirement matrix to calculate the
jobs embodied in trade for 2001 through 2003. Using require-
ment matrices for years other than 2000 for this calculation
yields very similar results. Note that our results are conditional
on the assumption that there are no drastic changes in the
requirement matrix after 2000.
Like other analyses based on input-output tables, ours is
limited by the assumptions that underlie these tables. Thus,
our analysis assumes constant-factor input shares to calculate
the input requirements for each industry. In addition, the data
do not allow us to account for differences in quality between
traded and nontraded goods.
Our results are all based on the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) system, because this system is used to
define the sectors in the input-output tables that we employ.
Results for 2003 are based on employment figures for April of
that year, the last month for which SIC-based employment
data were published. The import and export data that we use
are based on the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS), because no SIC-based trade data are available
after 1999. Before 1999, the difference between SIC- and
NAICS-based trade data does not imply important quantita-
tive and qualitative differences in our results.
More on Methodology
change in U.S. output









needed to replace U.S. net imports by the ratio of U.S.
employment to U.S.output.To calculate the first term,we use
the U.S.input-output tables constructed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (Chentrens and Andreassen 2003).These
tables allow us to account for both the direct jobs and the
support jobs needed to produce U.S.net imports.Including
support jobs takes into account the “multiplier effect”of job
losses—that is,the tendency of job losses to spread to sup-
porting or related positions.5
We estimate the U.S.jobs embodied in net imports for the
entire private economy and its three constituent sectors over
the 1983-2003 period.Our results,plotted in Chart 4,indi-
cate that 2.6 million jobs would have been needed to produce
total U.S. net imports in 2003. Roughly 2.5 million jobs
would have been needed to produce net imports in durable
manufactured goods in 2003,and about 1.3 million jobs to
produce net imports of nondurable manufactured goods in
the same year.By contrast,services trade ran a surplus,so
the United States exported output equivalent to 1.2 million
jobs.(Since the chart shows net imports,the 1.2 million net
export figure appears as a negative number.)
The trends in the three sectors also merit attention.
Beginning in 1997,all three show a rise in the jobs embodied in
net imports—meaning that,relative to the preceding years,the
sectors were losing more jobs to trade (on net) and contribut-
ing fewer jobs to U.S.payrolls.In the case ofthe services sector,
this rise reversed an earlier pattern: the U.S.jobs needed to
produce the country’s surplus of services exports had been
growing steadily since 1986,reaching a peak of 2.4 million jobs
in 1997.From 1997 to 2003,however,the number ofpayroll jobs
embodied in services net exports dropped by 1.2 million jobs.
This decline was almost as great as the decline of 1.6 million
jobs in the jobs contributed to U.S.payrolls by the two manu-
facturing sectors over the 1997-2003 period.
Interpreting Our Findings
Our results challenge the view that offshoring accounts for
much ofthe persistent weakness in U.S.employment during the
recovery.First,we have seen that the services and durable and
nondurable manufacturing sectors all show a rise in the jobs
embodied in net imports—or,equivalently,a decline in contri-
butions to U.S.payrolls—beginning in 1997.Significantly,this
pickup in jobs lost to net trade flows took place at a time when
the U.S.labor market as a whole was still expanding.Indeed,it
was not until 2000 that job losses overtook job gains and U.S.
payrolls began to decline (see Chart 2).The fact that the rise in
offshoring coexisted with a strong U.S.labor market during the
late 1990s undermines the popular notion that jobs lost to trade
played a large role in the sluggish growth ofoverall employment
after the 2001 recession.
Further evidence against such an association comes from
the behavior of jobs embodied in total net imports (Chart 4,
black line). Between 1997 and 2003, the number of jobs
embodied in total net imports rose by 2.9 million, which
amounts to about 40,000 jobs a month on average.The flow
from 1997 to 2001 averaged about 45,000 jobs a month;it fell
to about 30,000 jobs from 2001 to 2003.Thus,the growth of
jobs lost to trade actually slowed during the post-recession
period of weak job gains.
As a measure of magnitude, our estimates of the jobs
embodied in net trade flows suggest that offshoring has been
a limited phenomenon.Although 40,000 jobs a month may
seem to be a large number,we can put such statistics in per-
spective by dividing the number of jobs embodied in net
imports by total U.S.payrolls (Chart 5).What we find is that
relative to total employment,the number of jobs embodied
in recent net trade is small—never more than 2.4 percent
and sometimes negative.
While offshoring thus emerges as a comparatively small
part of the total employment picture in Chart 5,the overall
trend depicted in the chart suggests why concerns about jobs
lost to trade might have grown in recent years.As a share of
total employment, the number of jobs embodied in net
imports has continued to climb; in 2003,this measure was
2.4 percent,its maximum value for the period observed.The
increase in this measure might at first appear to conflict with
our finding that jobs embodied in net importshave grown at a
slower pace since 2001.Yet the conflict is easily resolved:From
1997 to early 2001, the labor market was tightening and
domestic job creation was high; although jobs embodied in
net imports were growing at a relatively fast pace, they
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis;  authors’ calculations.
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attracted less attention as a share of total employment.Then,
as job creation rates dropped dramatically from 2001 to 2003,
jobs embodied in net imports,though growing more slowly,
claimed a larger share of total employment.Thus,the loss of
jobs to overseas workers became much more conspicuous in
the later period.
One further exercise that can help us reach a more realistic
assessment of offshoring is to compare the jobs embodied in
total gross imports with the jobs embodied in net imports
(Chart 6).The contrast is striking—the number of jobs lost
through gross imports is nearly five times as large as the
number we find for net imports.Thus,omitting the benefits
of jobs created through export production—a common
practice in discussions of offshoring—will substantially
overstate the costs of trade for the U.S.labor market.
Uncounted Benefits of Trade
Although our estimates of the number of jobs lost to trade
improve upon earlier estimates,6 they capture only the
effects of trade now,holding many considerations fixed.The
full impact of trade is,however,more complex and difficult
to quantify.Our estimates recognize that jobs are created
through the production of U.S. exports, but they do not
address the broader benefits of trade in raising wealth.
In discussing the gains from trade,economists emphasize
that trade allows countries to specialize in the production of
particular goods or services.Specialization makes trading part-
ners richer because each exchanges goods it produces effi-
ciently for goods that its partners can produce at lower cost.
In one form of specialization,countries concentrate on a
particular phase of a product cycle.Some countries may spe-
cialize in the beginning phase of the cycle,when innovation
is needed to conceive a product and experiment with its
design. Other countries are better adapted to take on the
later phases of the cycle, when the product evolves into a
commodity and its design and manufacture become routine.
Since the United States has the highest rate of interna-
tional patenting per capita in the world,7it can be thought of
as specializing in product innovation,the first phase of the
cycle.Once a product matures,however,the United States
loses some of its comparative advantage in producing that
good. The country’s highly skilled workers may be too
expensive to be internationally competitive in the routine
production of many commodities.Thus,when a product or
service becomes a commodity, the most routine jobs
involved in its production may be sent overseas.
Subsequently,competition among producers lowers the
price of the commodity,raising the purchasing power (or
wealth) of consumers and thus their demand not only for
that good but for others.This process is the source of new
jobs for the U.S.workers displaced when jobs go overseas.As
wealth increases and demand grows,these workers can find
employment elsewhere in the economy and perhaps move on
to the design and creation of the next new product.Seen in
this way,the country’s ability to continue sending jobs over-
seas may be,at least in part,a sign of its ongoing success in
innovation.8
The process we have described also creates wealth in the
developing countries that take over the production phase.Since
wealthier countries are better customers for U.S.products,the
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Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis;  authors’ calculations.
Chart 6
U.S. Jobs Embodied in Gross and Net Imports
Millions of jobs
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Our analysis suggests that offshoring has been a limited phe-
nomenon—and one that has contributed only marginally to
the labor market’s weak performance in recent years.Through
year-end 2003,the number of jobs embodied in net imports
did not exceed 2.4 percent of the country’s total employment.
Moreover,the jobs lost to net trade flows grew at a slower pace
after the recession than they did before—dropping from
45,000 jobs per month in 1997-2001 to 30,000 in 2001-03.
These findings provide little support for claims that the trans-
fer of U.S.jobs to overseas workers is largely to blame for the
jobless recovery.
Our conclusion that trade has only modestly affected aggre-
gate U.S.employment does not imply,however,that trade has
had no serious consequences for individual workers. Our
approach explicitly recognizes that jobs created through trade
may,to a greater or lesser extent,offset jobs lost to trade.But
even if these job gains and losses roughly balance for the U.S.
economy as a whole,they may not do so for individual work-
ers—that is,some workers who lose a job to imports may not
immediately find an equivalent position. Quantifying the
effects of trade on the well-being of workers is beyond the
scope of our analysis. Rather, our study offers a new, net
measure of the overall number of jobs embodied in recent
trade flows.
Notes
1. Throughout this article, the term “total employment”refers to nonfarm
business employment.This measure,which excludes government and farming
jobs,is commonly used by economists to represent the number of jobs in the
private sector.
2. More information about the relatively new Business Employment Dynamics
data series is available at <http://www.bls.gov/bdm/home.htm>.
3. See U.S.Department of Labor,Bureau of Labor Statistics,News,June 10,
2004,<http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/reloc.pdf>.
4. We caution that this exercise does not yield the number of jobs that would
actually be added to payroll employment if all net imports were produced in
the United States. To determine this number, we would have to take into
account any reallocations of labor that arise from the wage,price,and produc-
tivity effects of trade.We hold all these factors fixed in our analysis.
5. For example,if a firm loses production jobs to overseas workers,it may cut
back its payroll services staff accordingly.
6. For example,two often-cited estimates of services jobs lost to offshoring—
Goldman Sachs and Company (2003) and McCarthy (2002)—measure only
the gross flows of U.S.jobs to other countries.
7. Porter and Stern (2001) provide evidence on patenting per capita. The
authors also rank the United States first in a “National Innovative Capacity
Index.”
8. Maintaining this success over time,however,may become more difficult.
The country’s current specialization in innovation depends on the strength of
its science and engineering workforce. Current trends—in particular, the
declining numbers of U.S.science and engineering graduates and the dimin-
ished job market rewards for these graduates—may erode this dominance in
the future (see Freeman [2005]).
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